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RIGS-TO-REEFS:
REFOCUSING THE DEBATE IN CALIFORNIA
DAN ROTHBACH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Off the coast of Santa Barbara, they glow like Christmas trees in
the night sky. Oil platforms, rising up from the ocean floor, help
quench a nation’s thirst for energy. Ironically, these giant ocean
structures also attract a myriad of sea life, creating small but thriving
ecosystems. Because of this, a growing debate is emerging between
those who wish to see the rigs disappear entirely and those who
believe that doing so would destroy an important habitat. The latter
propose converting the rigs, once oil production ceases, into artificial
reefs, a plan appropriately known as rigs-to-reefs.
II. OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING AND
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Any exploration into the legal framework surrounding the rigsto-reefs debate must start with a historical purview of offshore oil
drilling in the United States. Offshore oil and gas exploration began
in earnest in the 1890s, and the drilling of the first oil well occurred in
1896 off the coast of Summerland, California, in Santa Barbara
County.1 Unlike the modern visage of a giant platform seemingly
suspended in the ocean, this early drilling operation consisted of a
series of wooden piers extending from the coast out into the ocean.2
Coastal oil exploration remained in its infancy, limited to the
Summerland model, until 1938. That year marked the construction of
the first drilling platform in unprotected waters, located in the Gulf of
* Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Duke Law School (2007).
1. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS
RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 2 (2005), available at http://www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/
GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf.
2. Dwight E. Sanders, California State Lands Commission: Decommissioning Policy and
Regulations, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California:
Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 16, 16 (Frank Manago & Bonnie
Williamson, eds., 1997).
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Mexico.3 For the first half-century, offshore oil drilling progressed
unimpeded.
The first major conflict in the forum of oil exploration involved a
jurisdictional battle between the federal government and the affected
coastal states in 1945. In a post-war world, it became evident that
unimpeded access to a constant supply of energy was a matter of
national security. President Truman recognized the potential oil
supply present in the continental shelf off the coast of the United
States.4 At the same time, the President recognized the jurisdictional
uncertainty associated with coastal oil exploration, and thus
proclaimed that the federal government retained territorial control
over shelf lands bounding the United States coasts.5 To assert its
rights, two years later the United States brought a trespass action
6
against the State of California. The federal government alleged that
California had negotiated leases for oil and gas exploration rights on
continental shelf lands over which the state lacked jurisdiction.7
California claimed authority over submerged lands three miles
8
offshore, in part on the basis of the equal footing doctrine. The court
held, in line with the Presidential Proclamation of 1945, that the
United States retained sole jurisdiction over all lands beneath the
ocean, not limited to the three-mile boundary asserted by California.9
This holding was extended with respect to oil drilling and exploration
10
11
in Louisiana and Texas in 1950. In dictum, however, the court
recognized the right of Congress to cede jurisdiction to the states.12 In
recognition of the need for clarity regarding offshore territory,
13
Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act. The central feature of
the Act was to define the seaward boundary of coastal states as three

3. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 1, 1945).
5. Id.
6. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), superseded by statute, Submerged
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 40-41.
10. See United States v. Lousiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
11. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
12. Id. at 40.
13. Ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).

05__ROTHBACH.DOC

Spring 2007]

8/17/2007 9:24 AM

RIGS-TO-REEFS

285

miles offshore,14 effectively returning to the states what was lost in the
prior Supreme Court decisions. This legislation was intended to
15
The
promote the exploration of offshore energy resources.
Submerged Lands Act provided states with the ability to continue
leasing activities that they had already begun. However, a true
federal legal regime governing offshore oil exploration rights was
created in a companion bill, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA).16
Despite an intent to encourage oil exploration, the Submerged
Lands Act did not contain any provisions governing the leasing or
development of the involved submerged lands. Instead, it merely
created jurisdictional boundaries between the states and the federal
government.17
With the enactment of the OCSLA, however,
Congress opened the door for expansive development of the outer
continental shelf. The OCSLA authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to sell exploration leases to the highest competitive bidder.18
19
The first such sale took place in 1954, and resultant sales now
produce nearly $5 billion in annual revenue for the federal
government.20 In its original form, the OCSLA had a very limited
scope and intent. The stated purpose of the legislation was solely to
allow the United States to lease oil exploration rights, and nothing
more.21 Rules governing the manner of drilling were similarly limited.
Original leases were to contain a provision requiring that operations
be conducted in accordance to “sound and efficient oilfield
practice,”22 a nebulous clause at best. Despite these limited measures,
the environmental impacts of offshore drilling were not immediately
apparent. Aside from the general issue of dropping tons of steel into
the ocean, the first decade post-OCSLA was free from noticeable
environmental harm.
The rosy picture of offshore drilling received a sharp jolt in 1969.
In January of that year, Union Oil, under an exploration lease from
the United States, began drilling a mile below the ocean surface off

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000).
H.R. REP. NO. 83-215, at 2 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1386.
Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953).
H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 1 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177, 2177.
Id. at 4.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 1.
Id. at 4.
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the coast of Santa Barbara, California. The boring breached a highpressure oil pocket, causing an explosion at the site and lead to oil
23
This
“congealing into a chocolate mousse mat a foot thick.”
calamity had the immediate impact of spurring the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).24 In enacting
NEPA, Congress recognized a lack of knowledge of the surrounding
ocean ecosystem, a notion impressed upon the legislature by the
aforementioned oil spill.25 At its core, NEPA requires federal
agencies to produce an environmental impact statement (EIS)
26
whenever they propose a major federal action. However, it was
unclear from the original language of the statute whether the lease of
oil exploration rights was covered.
In 1978, Congress made the question moot when it passed
27
amendments to the OCSLA. From an environmental standpoint,
these amendments represent the current state of the law governing
the leasing of offshore oil exploration rights. The 1978 amendments
specifically state that if a plan for development and exploration of
offshore oil resources is a major federal action, then an EIS must be
produced.28 Taking the plain meaning of the statute, a development
and exploration plan could conceptually be a nonmajor federal action
29
and thus not subject NEPA’s requirements. However, as a practical
matter, all plans for oil exploration in the outer continental shelf are
captured by NEPA and considered major federal actions.
Pursuant to its authority to grant leases under the OCSLA, the
Department of the Interior created the Minerals Management Service
(MMS) in 1982 to oversee the development of the outer continental
30
shelf. In granting a lease, the MMS takes the first step of publishing
31
a notice of intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register. When
preparing the notice, MMS is forced to look at alternatives to the
leasing proposal while also analyzing any adverse environmental

23. Gary Polakovic, Legacy of an Offshore Disaster: Thirty Years After Santa Barbara Spill,
New Battles Arise as Big Oil Moves Out and Little Oil Moves in, L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1999, at
A1.
24. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
25. H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, at 5, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2755.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
27. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(f) (2000).
29. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351(g) (2000).
30. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 51.
31. Id. at 16.
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impacts that drilling may create.32 One other aspect of the lease
agreements is fundamental for purposes of this paper. When a leased
field can no longer produce oil in an economical manner, all
equipment must be removed from the site, both above and below the
sea.33 However, the issue of what to do with abandoned oil rigs is not
closed by this lease term.
One final piece of Congressional legislation is essential to
understanding the rigs-to-reefs debate. In 1984, Congress enacted the
34
National Fishing Enhancement Act (NFEA). Looking purely at the
act title, the NFEA seems to have little to do with issues involving the
decommissioning of offshore oil rigs. The Act is intended to help
stem the tide of fishery degradation in the United States.35 To achieve
this goal, Congress sought to encourage the construction of artificial
36
reefs as fish habitats to help promote a replenishment of fish stocks.
Pursuant to this mission, the NFEA directs various federal agencies
to consult together in the creation of a National Artificial Reef Plan.37
The plan notes a preference toward the construction of new artificial
38
reefs. However, the plan also recognizes the effectiveness of some
“secondary use materials” already in place for other purposes.
Inclusive among “secondary use materials” are oil rigs, considered to
be de facto reefs under the plan.39 Based on this, MMS created a
national rigs-to-reefs program.40
III. RIGS-TO-REEFS: IN PRACTICE
Rigs-to-reefs is a national program. However, its current
application has been anything but comprehensive. From an ease of
use standpoint for oil rig operators, it would make sense for MMS to
administer the details of the rigs-to-reefs program on a uniform basis
nationwide. However, it is clear that offshore exploration is an area
where the federal government has been very deferential to the states.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 40.
Pub. L. No. 98-623, 98 Stat. 3394.
33 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2000).
33 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (2000).
33 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000).
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., DRAFT NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN
REVISION 23 (2002), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/irf/NARP.PDF.
39. Id.
40. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Rigs-to-Reefs Information (2005), http://www.gomr.mms.gov/
homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/information.html.
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To that end, MMS requires individual states to implement unique,
state-specific artificial reef plans, subject to MMS approval.
Currently, only two states have established an approved program:
Louisiana in 198641 and Texas in 1990.42 However, the Gulf of
Mexico, where these plans operate, includes the vast majority of
offshore oil rigs in the United States. By 1998, 5,654 oil platforms had
been in production at one time in the Gulf.43 Of those, 3,930 were still
active. In comparison, as of 2006, only 43 platforms are actively
44
producing oil off the coast of Southern California. Of the 1,715
retired Gulf of Mexico platforms, 128 were converted to artificial
reefs.45 The rigs-to-reefs program in the Gulf, despite this slow start,
is considered a success for the purpose of enhancing fishing
46
prospects.
The story in California is much different. In 2001, the Assembly
and the Senate both approved Senate Bill 1 (SB 1), legislation that
would have created an artificial reef plan similar to those in the Gulf
47
States. However, the governor vetoed the bill, with a note praising
the reasonableness of the provisions but claiming that the lack of
conclusive scientific evidence made such a proposal premature.48
Soon, however, twelve of Southern California’s forty-three active oil
rigs will stop producing oil and have to be decommissioned, bringing
the rigs-to-reefs debate back to the forefront.49
IV. THE STAKEHOLDERS: AN ANALYSIS
The uniqueness of the rigs-to-reefs problem is most readily seen
by the divergent interests groups involved. As seen in the defeat of
SB 1, the rigs-to-reefs issue has resulted in a number of unlikely
alliances, with commercial fishermen joining forces with

41. See generally La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, Artificial Reef Program (2005),
http://www.wlf.state.la.us/licenses/permits/artificialreefprogram.
42. See generally Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, Artificial Reefs Program (2005),
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/landwater/water/habitats/artificial_reef/artreef.phtml.
43. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Artificial Reefs: Oases for Marine Life in the Gulf (2005),
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/artificial-reefs.html.
44. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., STATUS OF LEASES AND QUALIFIED COMPANIES: PACIFIC
OCS REGION 24 (2006).
45. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 43.
46. LES DAUTERIVE, RIGS-TO-REEFS POLICY, PROGRESS, AND PERSPECTIVE 4 (2000),
available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/whatsnew/publicat/recpub/2000-073.pdf.
47. Cal. SB 1 (2001).
48. Gray Davis, Veto Message, Cal. SB 1 (2001).
49. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., supra note 44, at 23.
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environmental advocacy groups, pitted against oil companies and
recreational fishers.
Understanding the motivations of these
stakeholders is essential to developing a coherent understanding of
the rigs-to-reefs debate.
A. Oil Companies
The most obviously affected groups in creating a rigs-to-reefs
program are the entities that own the offshore oil platforms. Prior to
the NFEA, oil rig owners had only one option when oil production
ceased: complete dismantling of the offshore facilities. The notable
disadvantage of this option is the expense involved. The cost of
leaving something in the ocean is significantly less than the cost of
removing it from the ocean, especially as the depth of the water
increases. However, absent an alternative, these costs will be borne
entirely upon the oil companies. From an equitable standpoint,
however, it seems unnecessary to grant the platform owners relief
from the costs of platform removal. Because the original leases
anticipated removal once production ceased, it should also be fair to
assume that oil companies budgeted accordingly. Their treatment in
currently existing rigs-to-reefs programs seems to bear out this
opinion. MMS currently requires oil companies to donate half of
their cost savings from leaving structures in place to state agencies, as
a means to finance the artificial reef programs.50
Another important consideration for oil companies is flexibility.
There is an industry push to continue the current trend of allowing
individual platform operators a choice as to whether to fully
deconstruct a rig or leave parts in place as an artificial reef. The
industry has tried to emphasize that each oil rig possesses site-specific
differences that require analysis of many factors before decisions are
made.51 The interests of oil companies can then be narrowed down to
two specific points: cost certainty and operational flexibility.
B. Fishermen
Fishermen straddle the rigs-to-reefs issue. On one side sits the
recreational fisher, who sees the artificial reef as a boon because it

50. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 43.
51. David Tyler, Oil and Gas Industry Perspective Regarding Environmental Effects During
Decommissioning, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore
California: Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 177, 177 (Frank Manago &
Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997).
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provides a localized environment to facilitate his activities. On the
other side lie the commercial fishermen, who, in California, depend
mostly on trawling to sustain their livelihood.
Recreational fishermen provide potentially the strongest support
for rigs-to-reefs among all interested parties. The National Fishing
Enhancement Act is proof enough, as its chief intent is to improve
fish stocks for recreational fishers. In the California case, recreational
fishermen have been quick to point out two things. First, artificial
reefs present a significant opportunity for the growth of local fish
52
This might be attractive to recreational fishermen
populations.
because it is easier to catch large amounts of fish when they all
congregate in the same place. The other reason emphasized is that
recreational fishing generates significant revenue. Recreational
fishers estimate that in 1992, their industry added nearly $5 billion to
the California economy, which is a non-trivial amount.53 It is unclear,
however, how either converting oil rigs into artificial reefs or
removing them altogether would affect these figures.
On the other side are commercial fishermen. The commercial
fishing industry in California has been categorically opposed to the
rigs-to-reefs proposal. Most commercial fishing in California employs
trawlers, which risk getting caught on underwater structures, causing
54
damage to fishing equipment. There is also a sense, among
commercial fishermen, that the rigs-to-reefs deal is conceptually
biased toward recreational fishermen, thus limiting their desire to
accept rigs-to-reefs as a proposal.55
C. Environmental Groups
Environmental groups could be the potentially most ambiguous
stakeholders. If artificial reefs do enhance fish populations, and total
rig removal destroys fish habitat, then the rigs-to-reefs program
presents an environmentally satisfactory alternative to total removal.
52. Daniel Frumkes, United Anglers of Southern California / American Sportfishing
Association Perspective, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore
California: Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 184, 184 (Frank Manago &
Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997).
53. Id. at 190.
54. Southern California Trawlers Association Perspective, in Decommissioning and
Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future
Deepwater Challenges 182, 182 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997).
55. Chris Miller, Santa Barbara Lobster Trappers Perspective, in Decommissioning and
Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future
Deepwater Challenges 181, 181 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997).
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However, environmental groups have sought to frame the debate not
in terms of fish populations, but instead in terms of distrusting oil
companies. In supporting the veto of SB 1, one activist described the
legislative victory as not letting oil companies “get off the hook” for
rig removal as required under the initial lease terms.56
The
environmental lobby’s stance does not derive from a desire to
preserve fish habitat, but instead from a desire to limit oil exploration
off the California coast, noting that while some exploration cannot be
stopped, they at least hold out hope for complete removal of the
offshore structures once production ceases.57 To align interests in the
most beneficial way, then, it seems that the framework of the debate
must change to bring the environmental lobby on board.
D. Fish
Fish represent the most important yet most ignored stakeholder
in the rigs-to-reefs debate. None of the stakeholders discussed above
seem to recognize the interests of fish as living entities. The oil
companies and environmental groups, pitted across from one another,
seem to ignore fish all together. The fishermen, on the other hand,
see fish only as an economic unit. The problem is that a number of
fish species located near the California oil rigs are overfished and
58
subject to a Fishery Management Plan. A study conducted by Dr.
Milton Love of fish populations in and around the Santa Barbara oil
rigs found that significant amounts of various species of rockfish
inhabited the underwater structures of the oil rigs. Importantly, Love
found significant populations juvenile rockfish at the rigs.59 A specific
species, bocaccio, have been identified as a “Species of Concern” by
60
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) since 1999. Essential
to the successful recovery of the bocaccio, as well as other fish
populations is the survival of juveniles. To this extent, proposed

56. Miguel Bustillo & John Johnson, Governor Davis Gets Busy With His Green Pen, L.A.
Times, Oct. 14, 2001, at California 1.
57. Nichole Camozzi, Platform Abandonment and the Santa Barbara Channel, in
Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent
Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 173, 173 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson,
eds., 1997).
58. See generally MILTON S. LOVE, DONNA M. SCHROEDER, & MARY NISHIMOTO, THE
ECOLOGICAL ROLE OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION PLATFORMS AND NATURAL OUTCROPS
ON FISHES IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL CALIFORNIA: A SYNTHESIS OF INFORMATION (2003).
59. Id. at 3-1.
60. NOAA NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SPECIES OF CONCERN: BOCACCIO 1 (2007),
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/species/bocaccio_detailed.pdf.
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changes to the Pacific Fisheries Management Plan include
categorizing oil platforms as “Habitat Areas of Particular Concern”
61
for the rockfish. Clearly, then, the focus should be on the fish.
V. TOWARD AN OUTCOME:
CONSOLIDATING INTERESTS THROUGH PRECAUTION
The rigs-to-reefs debate, at its core, is an amalgamation of
interests that are not as divergent as they appear. Oil companies
want to achieve financial savings by avoiding total removal of
offshore rigs. Commercial fishermen want to be able to fish without
the risk of catching equipment on submerged structures.
Environmental groups distrust the oil companies and fear a lack of
liability for unanticipated problems. Recreational fishermen want the
opportunity to catch greater numbers of fish. Fish, to the extent that
they are cognizant of their interests, want to grow in numbers.
The failure to reach an agreement thus far can in part be blamed
on a lack of understanding about what is at stake. There seems to be
a tendency among the anti-rigs-to-reefs contingent to view the natural
ocean environment as the way it was prior to offshore oil exploration.
Assumptions are made that oil rigs have actually displaced fish from
their natural habitat rather than actually growing the current fish
stocks. There is also a rhetorical battle being waged that undermines
comprise. When the program is derogatorily referred to as “rigs-togrief” or “rigs-to-rubbish,” critical dialogue seems far-fetched.62 This
view also ignores the reality of the situation: the oil rigs are there, and
the fish flock to them.
The debate needs to be shifted away from what we do not know
and toward what we do know. What is known is that juvenile fish
populations around offshore oil rigs are significant. Love goes so far
as to describe the oil rigs as “nursery grounds” for overfished species
63
of rockfish. The precautionary principle would likely hold that, if
these rigs are removed, it is unknown what the long term effect on
rockfish populations will be. It seems probable, though, that
removing the oil rigs would in essence destroy the juvenile rockfish
stocks, and inevitably accelerate the decline of an already at-risk
fishery. By framing the debate in terms of preserving the fishery, it

61. 71 Fed. Reg. 1,998 (Jan. 12, 2006).
62. Kenneth R. Weiss, ‘Rigs to Reefs’ Plan Stirs Debate, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 2001, at
California 1.
63. Id.
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almost seems obvious to support the creation of a rigs-to-reefs
program off the California coast. In doing so, it is now possible to
address the stakeholders’ concerns.
The two overriding factors that led to the initial failure of a
California rigs-to-reefs program under SB 1 were concerns over
unjustly enriching oil companies as well as fears over long-term
liability. Both of these issues can be addressed together. In a world
where oil companies completely dismantle an offshore rig, they incur
the full cost of removal. However, post-removal, they are free from
any long-term liability. The opposite is true in the idealized rigs-toreefs program, likely hoped for by oil companies and equally vilified
by environmental groups. In reality, the MMS rigs-to-reefs program,
as implemented in both Louisiana and Texas, requires the company
converting the oil rig into a reef to donate a portion of the cost
savings to the state, in order to cover the costs of managing the
artificial reef.64 These payments are effectively treated as restitution.
There is an opportunity, however, to use these payments to capture
the liability issue. Rather than viewing payments from an oil
company to the state as restitution, they could be considered liability
payments. Rather than specifying a fixed amount of payment in all
cases, a sliding scale should be created. To facilitate administrative
necessity, a base line amount is necessary. Beyond that, however, the
oil company should be free to, in essence, pick its poison between
long-term liability and short-term financial gain. This serves two
crucial purposes. First, it limits the state’s risk, by either placing
liability solely upon the oil company or compensating the state for
assuming the risk. Additionally, it forces oil companies to analyze
risks into the long-term, rather than just passing off a potential mess
onto the state.
If the proposal stopped right there and was otherwise identical to
MMS’s current rigs-to-reefs program, the oil companies would be the
clear winners, gaining payment flexibility while retaining the ultimate
flexibility to choose between complete dismantling of rigs or
conversion into artificial reefs. However, the refocused goal here is
the preservation of coastal fisheries. To that end, it seems imprudent
to give oil companies a choice. Instead, the determination of whether
to convert a rig into a reef should come from NMFS. This approach
is consistent with NMFS’s mandate to create regional fishery
management plans. An important step should be added, however, to

64. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 50.
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ensure that the decisions are fully informed. For all intents and
purposes, a lease for oil exploration rights is a major federal action
and thus requires the production of an EIS. However, an EIS is only
required upon construction of an oil rig.65 Under the lease agreement,
the oil company is required to eventually dismantle the rig
completely. This can only be avoided with an exception granted by
MMS. Granting a rigs-to-reefs exception should be considered a
major federal action and thus require an EIS. This will help provide a
case-by-case analysis of rigs-to-reefs conversions, rather than
promoting either a one-size-fits-all approach or allowing oil
companies to dictate the process. This should assuage the fears of
environmental groups, distrustful of oil companies’ intentions, by
ensuring federal oversight and a means to assign liability.
Like the other stakeholders already discussed, the interests of
commercial fishermen can also be accounted for. The main concern
presented was based on a fear of trawling equipment becoming
caught on submerged structures. Most proposed plans for converting
rigs to reefs have oil companies remove the upper parts of the rig to a
depth of 85 feet. This, by itself, is unsatisfactory to commercial
66
fishermen because trawlers often reach to depths of 300 feet.
Additionally, the removal of above surface identifiers makes it
difficult for fishermen to locate reefs. Unfortunately, the 85-foot
level is essential for the growth of the rockfish population. Juvenile
rockfish seem to thrive at depths of 85 feet and below, making it an
essential cut-off point.67 However, commercial fishermen are not at a
loss. Two opportunities present themselves. First, injuries to
commercial fishermen could be linked to the liability payment
scheme discussed above by requiring either the state or the oil
company, depending on the relative levels of liability, to both
maintain above water identifiers, such as buoys, as well as potentially
compensate the fishermen for the harm. This ties into the second
potential solution.
In addition to requiring EIS’s, the 1978
amendments to the OCSLA created the Fishermen’s Contingency

65. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Environmental Comment – Public Review (2006),
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/nepa/nepaprocess.html.
66. John Richards, Commercial Fisheries: Long Term Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas
Facilities Decommissioning, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities
Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 111, 112 (Frank
Manago & Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997).
67. LOVE, supra note 58, at 4-11.
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Fund.68 The fund exists for the purpose of compensating commercial
fishermen who have been harmed by oil exploration in the outer
continental shelf. However, the fund only relates to active rigs, under
the likely assumption that all other rigs would be completely
dismantled. This fund should be extended, however, to include oil
rigs converted into artificial reefs, and injuries caused thereby. With
these two solutions, commercial fishermen will also see their interests
addressed while maintaining focus on the protection of fish habit.
The final stakeholders are the recreational fishers. They bring
strong support for the rigs-to-reefs program, so it is ironic that they
should actually be limited in their activities. Again, the purpose of
rigs-to-reefs in California should be to protect rockfish populations.
Allowing recreational fishermen unimpeded access to the fish stocks
runs completely counter to this goal. This limitation can be
implemented through the Fisheries Management Plan. Of all the
groups to limit, recreational fishermen seem like they would be the
least affected group. The economic valuation of the recreational
fishing industry came from a time without a rigs-to-reefs program,
thus making it unclear whether limiting access to newly designated
artificial reefs would have any effect on the industry. In fact, NMFS
has already begun to limit the direct fishing of the bocaccio species of
rockfish.69 Additionally, the long-term effect will be the significant
growth of the rockfish population, which should provide significant
opportunities for recreational fishermen in the future.
When pressed with what seem like intractable interests, it is
essential to frame the debate around a common goal, in this case the
protection of fisheries. Through creative decision-making, solutions
can present themselves in a way that all parties will find reasonable,
even if not ideal. Creating a formalized rigs-to-reefs program, while
perhaps fraught with short-term negatives, will help sustain and
potentially revitalize a once doomed fishery. That is a goal that, in
the long-term, will benefit all interested parties.

68. 43 U.S.C. § 1842 (2000).
69. NOAA NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 60, at 1.

